Fractional matching markets
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Publication:516999
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.006zbMath1394.91305OpenAlexW3122263917MaRDI QIDQ516999
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.006
Related Items
The object allocation problem with random priorities, Foundations of pseudomarkets: Walrasian equilibria for discrete resources, Compromises and rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching, The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching
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