Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
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Publication:517005
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.005zbMath1394.91302OpenAlexW2535734499MaRDI QIDQ517005
Muriel Niederle, Clayton R. Featherstone
Publication date: 16 March 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.005
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Uses Software
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