On the self-(in)stability of weighted majority rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.10.010zbMath1394.91122OpenAlexW2547708149MaRDI QIDQ517007

Yaron Azrieli, Semin Kim

Publication date: 16 March 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.010

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesself-stabilityweighted majority rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Stable constitutions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Self-selective social choice functions
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions

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