On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items

DOI10.1073/pnas.1309533110zbMath1292.91086OpenAlexW2088970293WikidataQ37010594 ScholiaQ37010594MaRDI QIDQ5171012

Xinye Li, Andrew Chi-Chih Yao

Publication date: 25 July 2014

Published in: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1309533110

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites Work

• Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
• Mixed bundling auctions
• Multidimensional mechanism design: revenue maximization and the multiple-good monopoly
• Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
• Optimal Auction Design
• Properties of Probability Distributions with Monotone Hazard Rate