Spanning tree auctions: a complete characterization

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.001zbMath1397.91272OpenAlexW2560667295MaRDI QIDQ518710

Abdul Quadir

Publication date: 30 March 2017

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

connected graphnon-bossinessGroves mechanismsspanning tree auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Roberts' theorem with neutrality: a social welfare ordering approach
• Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Efficient Auctions
• An Efficient Auction
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