A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions

DOI10.2307/2297669zbMath0561.90100OpenAlexW1999707888MaRDI QIDQ5187107

Ronald M. Harstad, Dan Levin

Publication date: 1985

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297669

zbMATH Keywords

common-value auctionssecond-price auctionsdominance solvable gameDominant strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (11)

Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions ⋮ Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions ⋮ On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model ⋮ Dominance-solvable common-value large auctions ⋮ Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information ⋮ Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions ⋮ Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values ⋮ Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire ⋮ Comprehensive rationalizability ⋮ Private information revelation in common-value auctions ⋮ Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information

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