The kernel of a patent licensing game: the optimal number of licensees
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Publication:518717
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.01.001zbMath1397.91040OpenAlexW2574952255MaRDI QIDQ518717
Naoki Watanabe, Shin Kishimoto
Publication date: 30 March 2017
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2017.01.001
Related Items (3)
Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ On the core of a patent licensing game ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
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