Executive Control and Legislative Success

DOI10.1093/restud/rdq030zbMath1218.91145OpenAlexW3122080190WikidataQ110167444 ScholiaQ110167444MaRDI QIDQ5198888

Daniel Diermeier, Razvan Vlaicu

Publication date: 9 August 2011

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq030

zbMATH Keywords

legislative bargainingexecutive controlconfidence requirementlegislative success ratespresidential versus parliamentary government

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) History, political science (91F10)

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A bargaining model of endogenous procedures ⋮ Characterization of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a non-cooperative model of dynamic policy-making with a persistent agenda setter ⋮ Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation

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