Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
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Publication:5198892
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDQ033zbMath1218.91105OpenAlexW1968675752MaRDI QIDQ5198892
Daniel Krähmer, Roland Strausz
Publication date: 9 August 2011
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/%7Elsbester/papers/ppp2.pdf
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
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