Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private Monitoring
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Publication:5198894
DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDQ036zbMath1218.91119OpenAlexW2088775169MaRDI QIDQ5198894
Publication date: 9 August 2011
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/fa5c98af314abdd7393fcc071d1cd00de2c8d523
repeated gameimperfect private monitoringWTOtrigger strategiesinternational trade agreementstrade disputesconcealed trade barriers
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