Path-disruption games: bribery and a probabilistic model
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Publication:519896
DOI10.1007/s00224-016-9669-1zbMath1411.91149OpenAlexW2314683422MaRDI QIDQ519896
Adrian Marple, Jörg Rothe, Anja Rey
Publication date: 31 March 2017
Published in: Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-016-9669-1
Games involving graphs (91A43) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)
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