International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
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Publication:5202487
DOI10.2307/2938174zbMath0724.90017OpenAlexW2159556518MaRDI QIDQ5202487
Publication date: 1991
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2938174
dynamic gamesmoral hazardborrowerlenderoptimal pattern of capital flowsrisk of repudiationsovereign lending
Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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