Competition in the Presence of Counterfeiters: The Case of Fines Imposed on Counterfeiters and Pocketed by the Genuine Firm

DOI10.1142/S0219198919500038zbMath1429.91083OpenAlexW2920874293MaRDI QIDQ5207517

Andrea Di Liddo

Publication date: 2 January 2020

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198919500038

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryStackelberg equilibriaintellectual property rightsfinescounterfeiting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (1)

Fines imposed on counterfeiters and pocketed by the genuine firm. A differential game approach

Cites Work

• Counterfeiting, enforcement and social welfare
• Fighting strategies in a market with counterfeits
• Monopoly and product quality
• Supply chain structure in a market with deceptive counterfeits
• Analysis of monitoring and limiting of commercial cheating: a newsvendor model
• Strategic pricing and advertising in the presence of a counterfeiter
• Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry

This page was built for publication: Competition in the Presence of Counterfeiters: The Case of Fines Imposed on Counterfeiters and Pocketed by the Genuine Firm