Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring

DOI10.3982/QE564zbMATH Open1430.91078WikidataQ127945124 ScholiaQ127945124MaRDI QIDQ5208573

Ofer Setty

Publication date: 8 January 2020

Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://qeconomics.org/ojs/index.php/qe/article/view/671/663

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardoptimal contractsunemployment insurancejob-search monitoring

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Actuarial mathematics (91G05) Labor markets (91B39) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

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