Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods

DOI10.1109/TAC.2019.2908717zbMath1482.91099arXiv1711.06774OpenAlexW2963032166MaRDI QIDQ5211247

Pier Giuseppe Sessa, N. S. Walton, Maryam Kamgarpour, Orcun Karaca

Publication date: 28 January 2020

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1711.06774

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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