An Efficient Market Design for Electricity Networks With Strategic Users Possessing Local Information

DOI10.1109/TCNS.2019.2913616OpenAlexW2940997937WikidataQ127962064 ScholiaQ127962064MaRDI QIDQ5211892

Demosthenis Teneketzis, Mohammad Rasouli

Publication date: 28 January 2020

Published in: IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/tcns.2019.2913616

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Systems theory; control (93-XX) Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX)

Related Items (4)

Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Compartmental observability approach for the optimal transparency problem in multi-agent systems ⋮ Parametrized inexact-ADMM based coordination games: a normalized Nash equilibrium approach ⋮ Peer-to-peer electricity market analysis: from variational to generalized Nash equilibrium

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