From Tarski to Gödel—or how to derive the second incompleteness theorem from the undefinability of truth without self-reference

DOI10.1093/LOGCOM/EXZ004zbMath1444.03167arXiv1803.03937OpenAlexW2963138781MaRDI QIDQ5213387

Albert Visser

Publication date: 3 February 2020

Published in: Journal of Logic and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.03937

zbMATH Keywords

consistencytruthself-referenceformal theories

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40) Relative consistency and interpretations (03F25)

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