A Deflationary Account of the Truth of the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal{G}$$

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_5zbMath1429.03041OpenAlexW1261777582MaRDI QIDQ5213627

Mario Piazza, Gabriele Pulcini

Publication date: 4 February 2020

Published in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30)

Related Items (2)

What’s so Special About the Gödel Sentence $$\mathcal {G}$$ ? ⋮ The implicit commitment of arithmetical theories and its semantic core

Cites Work

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• Transfinite Progressions: A Second Look at Completeness
• The Goal of Archimedes' Sand Reckoner
• Reflections on Concrete Incompleteness
• What is a proof?
• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
• A concise introduction to mathematical logic
• How innocent is deflationism?

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