Dependence and Independence in Social Choice: Arrow’s Theorem
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Publication:5213648
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-31803-5_11zbMath1429.91156OpenAlexW2501614427MaRDI QIDQ5213648
Publication date: 4 February 2020
Published in: Dependence Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31803-5_11
Related Items (9)
A finite axiomatization of conditional independence and inclusion dependencies ⋮ A Conflict Tolerant Logic of Explicit Evidence ⋮ Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover ⋮ Arrow's decisive coalitions ⋮ COMPLETE LOGICS FOR ELEMENTARY TEAM PROPERTIES ⋮ Axiomatizing first order consequences in inclusion logic ⋮ Negation and partial axiomatizations of dependence and independence logic revisited ⋮ Complexity thresholds in inclusion logic ⋮ Counting of Teams in First-Order Team Logics
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