Saving Proof from Paradox: Gödel’s Paradox and the Inconsistency of Informal Mathematics

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_11zbMath1429.03048OpenAlexW2558172047MaRDI QIDQ5213764

Fenner Stanley Tanswell

Publication date: 4 February 2020

Published in: Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://figshare.com/articles/Saving_proof_from_paradox_G_del_s_paradox_and_the_inconsistency_of_informal_mathematics/9589094

zbMATH Keywords

formal systemformal languagemathematical reasoningmathematical practiceincompleteness theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Paraconsistent logics (03B53) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

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Paraconsistent Computation and Dialetheic Machines ⋮ A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof

Cites Work

• How to think about informal proofs
• Informal proofs and mathematical rigour
• Why Do We Prove Theorems?
• Prove—Once More and Again
• The Derivation-Indicator View of Mathematical Practice
• The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal
• Mathematical pluralism
• On Godel Sentences and What They Say
• A Critique of a Formalist-Mechanist Version of the Justification of Arguments in Mathematicians' Proof Practices
• How to Nominalize Formalism†
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