Maximality in the Farsighted Stable Set

DOI10.3982/ECTA16047zbMath1431.91019OpenAlexW2954421866WikidataQ127225884 ScholiaQ127225884MaRDI QIDQ5214116

Rajiv Vohra, Debraj Ray

Publication date: 7 February 2020

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16047

zbMATH Keywords

maximalitystable setsfarsightednesshistory-dependent expectations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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