Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
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Publication:521877
DOI10.1007/s00182-015-0519-1zbMath1398.91457OpenAlexW2162661040MaRDI QIDQ521877
Dinko Dimitrov, Emiliya A. Lazarova
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/57651/1/Paths_to_stability_IJGT_R1.pdf
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Cites Work
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