Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result
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Publication:521884
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0528-8zbMath1398.91029OpenAlexW2274026810MaRDI QIDQ521884
Publication date: 12 April 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0528-8
Bayesian gamesKhan-Rath-Sun game (KRS game)pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)saturated probability spaces
Related Items (2)
Pareto refinements of pure-strategy equilibria in games with public and private information ⋮ On pure-strategy equilibria in games with correlated information
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