Fast Convergence of Best-Reply Dynamics in Aggregative Games

DOI10.1287/moor.2017.0868zbMath1454.91009OpenAlexW2765112818MaRDI QIDQ5219297

Yakov Babichenko

Publication date: 11 March 2020

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2017.0868

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumCournot oligopolyaggregative gamesfast convergencebest-reply dynamicssmall influence games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (4)

Lower bounds for the query complexity of equilibria in Lipschitz games ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Lower bounds for the query complexity of equilibria in Lipschitz games ⋮ On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application to network games

Cites Work

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• Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation
• Strategic complements and substitutes, and potential games
• How long to equilibrium? The communication complexity of uncoupled equilibrium procedures
• Potential games
• Probability inequalities for the sum in sampling without replacement
• Aggregative games and best-reply potentials
• Best-reply dynamics in large binary-choice anonymous games
• Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games
• Lipschitz Games
• Ballot problems

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