Segmentation, Incentives, and Privacy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5219697
DOI10.1287/moor.2017.0903zbMath1443.91017arXiv1806.00966OpenAlexW3105030350WikidataQ59379574 ScholiaQ59379574MaRDI QIDQ5219697
Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz, Kobbi Nissim
Publication date: 12 March 2020
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1806.00966
Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Discrete location and assignment (90B80) Marketing, advertising (90B60)
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