Location Games on Networks: Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria

DOI10.1287/moor.2017.0921zbMath1443.91074arXiv1601.07414OpenAlexW3123411074MaRDI QIDQ5219715

Marco Scarsini, Gaëtan Fournier

Publication date: 12 March 2020

Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1601.07414

zbMATH Keywords

large gamesprice of anarchyprice of stabilitypure equilibriaHotelling gameslocation games on networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Spatial models in economics (91B72)

Related Items (8)

Facility location games with ordinal preferences ⋮ Multiunit Facility Location Games ⋮ General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games ⋮ Social Networks from a Designer’s Viewpoint ⋮ Sequential Location Game on Continuous Directional Star Networks ⋮ Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don't always go to the closest firm ⋮ Bounding quality of pure Nash equilibria in dual-role facility location games ⋮ The Buck-Passing Game

Cites Work

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• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"
• Algorithms, games, and the internet
• The Existence of Equilibria in the 3-Facility Hotelling Model in a Tree
• Inequalities: theory of majorization and its applications

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