Selling with evidence
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Publication:5225078
DOI10.3982/TE2885zbMath1422.91311OpenAlexW2618705568MaRDI QIDQ5225078
Frédéric Koessler, Vasiliki Skreta
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2885
mechanism designinformed principalconsumer heterogeneityproduct information disclosurecertificationinterdependent valuations
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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