Communication and cooperation in repeated games
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Publication:5225084
DOI10.3982/TE3049zbMath1422.91090OpenAlexW2599368478WikidataQ127805199 ScholiaQ127805199MaRDI QIDQ5225084
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3049
Cooperative games (91A12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Related Items (6)
Toward the Nash equilibrium solutions for large-scale pentagonal fuzzy continuous static games ⋮ On Stackelberg leader with min-max followers to solve fuzzy continuous static games ⋮ Private monitoring and communication in the repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ Equilibrium design in an \(n\)-player quadratic game ⋮ Delegation and ambiguity in correlated equilibrium
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