Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games
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Publication:5225086
DOI10.3982/TE3230zbMath1422.91085OpenAlexW3122362656MaRDI QIDQ5225086
Ulrich Doraszelski, Juan F. Escobar
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3230
Decision theory (91B06) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Dynamic games (91A25)
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