The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure

DOI10.3982/ECTA15668zbMath1422.91128OpenAlexW2925044727MaRDI QIDQ5225128

Yingni Guo, Eran Shmaya

Publication date: 19 July 2019

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15668

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamesinformation designnested intervalsprivately informed receiver

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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