Stable Matching in Large Economies
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Publication:5225243
DOI10.3982/ECTA13547zbMath1422.91550WikidataQ128475790 ScholiaQ128475790MaRDI QIDQ5225243
Fuhito Kojima, Yeon-Koo Che, Jinwoo Kim
Publication date: 19 July 2019
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
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