Handbook of Computational Social Choice

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Publication:5228018

DOI10.1017/CBO9781107446984zbMath1436.91001OpenAlexW4296288933MaRDI QIDQ5228018

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Publication date: 8 August 2019

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107446984




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