A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002zbMath1393.91067OpenAlexW2290108234MaRDI QIDQ522997

Yong-Cai Geng, Sumit K. Garg

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsallocation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium

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