Exploring the scope of neurometrically informed mechanism design

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.001zbMath1393.91087OpenAlexW2401057487MaRDI QIDQ523002

Antonio Rangel, Ian Krajbich, Colin F. Camerer

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/76635/

zbMATH Keywords

decision makingbehavioral economicsexperimentspublic goodsmechanism designneuroeconomics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

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