Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
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Publication:523008
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.003zbMath1393.91123OpenAlexW3124974000MaRDI QIDQ523008
Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng, Xiaohan Zhong
Publication date: 20 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.003
Related Items (9)
Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Epsilon-stability in school choice ⋮ Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions ⋮ High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ The instability of matching with overconfident agents ⋮ The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions ⋮ Self-selection in school choice ⋮ Assignment mechanisms: common preferences and information acquisition
Cites Work
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Constrained school choice
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
- Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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