Sincere voting in large elections

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010zbMath1393.91044OpenAlexW2185328024MaRDI QIDQ523009

Adam Meirowitz, Avidit Acharya

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votinginformative votingsincere voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences

Cites Work

• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• The calculus of ethical voting
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

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