Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.003zbMath1393.91045OpenAlexW1750045767WikidataQ42038855 ScholiaQ42038855MaRDI QIDQ523012

Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer, Micael Castanheira

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://europepmc.org/articles/pmc5348044

zbMATH Keywords

experimentspluralityaggregate uncertaintymulticandidate electionsrational voter model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment ⋮ Coordinated democracy ⋮ (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting ⋮ Electoral turnout with divided opposition ⋮ Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules ⋮ Electoral institutions with impressionable voters

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Do voters vote ideologically?
• The calculus of ethical voting
• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule
• An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections
• Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting
• One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Voting as Communicating
• On the Theory of Strategic Voting1

This page was built for publication: Multicandidate elections: aggregate uncertainty in the laboratory