Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.005zbMath1393.91065OpenAlexW2268335551MaRDI QIDQ523018

Ritesh Jain, Paul J. Healy

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsNash implementationdemand revelation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Give and let give: alternative mechanisms based on voluntary contributions

Cites Work

• On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
• Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms
• The Existence of Efficient and Incentive Compatible Equilibria with Public Goods
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Incentives in Teams
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments