How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.10.004zbMath1393.91023OpenAlexW2177636650MaRDI QIDQ523024

Howard Rosenthal, Nilanjan Roy, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

communicationpublic good provisioncheap talkmessage space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (8)

The power and limits of sequential communication in coordination games ⋮ Demanding or deferring? An experimental analysis of the economic value of communication with attitude ⋮ Fostering collusion through action revision in duopolies ⋮ Environmental feedback and cooperation in climate change dilemma ⋮ Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization ⋮ Evolution of global contribution in multi-level threshold public goods games with insurance compensation ⋮ Should the talk be cheap in contribution games? ⋮ Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods

Cites Work

• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• Multistage Games with Communication
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission

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