The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

DOI10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3zbMath1404.91120OpenAlexW2096811392MaRDI QIDQ523061

Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/25190

zbMATH Keywords

common valuesTullock contestsvalue of public information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (5)

On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests ⋮ Information in Tullock contests ⋮ Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information ⋮ Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Common-value group contests with asymmetric information

Cites Work

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• Information acquisition in conflicts
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• Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
• On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
• Contest success functions: an extension
• Information in conflicts.
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.
• Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
• Population uncertainty in contests
• Bayesian Implementation

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