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Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy

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Publication:523185
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DOI10.1007/s11590-016-1061-1zbMath1366.91014OpenAlexW2465362964MaRDI QIDQ523185

Gino Loyola

Publication date: 20 April 2017

Published in: Optimization Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-016-1061-1


zbMATH Keywords

ultimatum gameenvynegative externalitynegotiation breakdown


Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)


Related Items (2)

Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ Ultimatum bargaining with envy under incomplete information



Cites Work

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  • Bargaining and negative externalities
  • Externalities and bargaining disagreement
  • Trust, reciprocity, and social history
  • A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
  • Responder feelings in a three-player three-option ultimatum game: affective determinants of rejection behavior
  • A theory of reciprocity
  • A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
  • A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
  • Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
  • Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities




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