Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints
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Publication:5232161
DOI10.1137/17M1149717zbMath1432.91088MaRDI QIDQ5232161
Publication date: 29 August 2019
Published in: SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://epubs.siam.org/doi/pdf/10.1137/17M1149717
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Cites Work
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