Algorithmic Aspects of Equilibria of Stable Marriage Model with Complete Preference Lists

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_8zbMath1420.91232OpenAlexW165765806MaRDI QIDQ5232794

Tomomi Matsui

Publication date: 13 September 2019

Published in: Operations Research Proceedings (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20009-0_8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cites Work

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• Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
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• Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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