The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
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Publication:523460
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015zbMath1409.91183OpenAlexW2551090796WikidataQ124838431 ScholiaQ124838431MaRDI QIDQ523460
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.015
strategy-proofnessmany-to-many matchingdeferred acceptance algorithmblocking lemmamax-min preferences
Related Items
Many-to-many matching based task allocation for dispersed computing, Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets, Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts
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