Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.002zbMath1409.91184OpenAlexW2254016172MaRDI QIDQ523462

Sangram Vilasrao Kadam

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://scholar.harvard.edu/kadam/node/139666

zbMATH Keywords

matching with contractsmany-to-one matchingsubstitutable completabilityunilateral substitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (9)

On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts ⋮ Contracts versus salaries in matching: a general result ⋮ Rationalizable choice functions ⋮ Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts ⋮ A college admissions clearinghouse ⋮ Some further properties of the cumulative offer process ⋮ An improved bound to manipulation in large stable matches ⋮ Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts ⋮ Contracts are not salaries in the hidden-substitutes domain

Cites Work

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• Testing substitutability
• Unilateral substitutability implies substitutable completability in many-to-one matching with contracts
• On sufficient conditions for the existence of stable matchings with contracts
• Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
• Relaxing the substitutes condition in matching markets with contracts
• Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
• Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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