Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.003zbMath1409.91101OpenAlexW2560592643MaRDI QIDQ523473

Mert Kimya

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

double implementationbehavioral mechanism designNash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Deposit contract design with relatively partially honest agents ⋮ Implementation with a sympathizer ⋮ A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents ⋮ Motives and implementation with rights structures ⋮ Strong implementation with partially honest individuals ⋮ Double implementation without no-veto-power

Cites Work

• Mechanism design and intentions
• To err is human: implementation in quantal response equilibria
• Implementation without rationality assumptions
• Rationalizable implementation
• Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Direct implementation with minimally honest individuals
• Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Bayesian implementation with partially honest individuals
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Implementation with evidence
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

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