Meet the lemons: an experiment on how cheap-talk overcomes adverse selection in decentralized markets
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Publication:523475
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.001zbMath1409.91078OpenAlexW3122704937MaRDI QIDQ523475
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.11.001
experimentinformation transmissionadverse selectionfrictionscheap-talkdecentralized marketsmarket for lemons
Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)
Related Items (3)
Voluntary disclosure of private information and unraveling in the market for lemons: an experiment ⋮ Referral hiring and wage formation in a market with adverse selection ⋮ Does risk aversion explain behavior in a lemon market?
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Cites Work
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