Voting as communicating: mandates, multiple candidates, and the signaling voter's curse

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005zbMath1409.91106OpenAlexW2565394785MaRDI QIDQ523481

Joseph McMurray

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

electionspolarizationabstentionvotinginformation aggregationturnoutpublic opinionideologyjury theoremmandatespartiesswing voter's curse

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

Polling in a proportional representation system ⋮ The Bismut-Elworthy-Li formula for mean-field stochastic differential equations ⋮ Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections ⋮ Wisdom of the crowd? Information aggregation in representative democracy

Cites Work

• Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings
• Mandate and paternalism: a theory of large elections
• A signaling model of repeated elections
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
• Voting as Communicating
• Public Protests and Policy Making*
• Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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