Propaganda and credulity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2016.12.006zbMath1409.91208OpenAlexW2564026826MaRDI QIDQ523483

Andrew T. Little

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.006

zbMATH Keywords

political economyauthoritarian politicspropaganda

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) History, political science (91F10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (3)

Optimal overconfidence in the presence of information manipulation ⋮ Creating confusion ⋮ Information manipulation and competition

Cites Work

• Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers
• Naive audience and communication bias
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*

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