Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
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Publication:523498
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005zbMath1409.91068OpenAlexW2575083990MaRDI QIDQ523498
Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy, Sun-Tak Kim
Publication date: 21 April 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005
votinginformation acquisitionexperimental economicsinformation aggregationfree-ridingCondorcet jury model
Related Items (6)
Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
Cites Work
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Rational ignorance and voting behavior
- Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Information acquisition in committees
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
- The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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