Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005zbMath1409.91068OpenAlexW2575083990MaRDI QIDQ523498

Sourav Bhattacharya, John Duffy, Sun-Tak Kim

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.005

zbMATH Keywords

votinginformation acquisitionexperimental economicsinformation aggregationfree-ridingCondorcet jury model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (6)

Does free information provision crowd out costly information acquisition? It's a matter of timing ⋮ Costly information acquisition in centralized matching markets ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
• Rational ignorance and voting behavior
• Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games.
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Information acquisition in committees
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

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